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Les droits des minorités religieuses 
The Rights of Religious Minorities 
Gordon FAIRWEATHER * 
A travers l'évolution jurisprudentielle, l'auteur retrace la protection 
accordée au principe fondamental de la liberté de religion. Quel fut l'apport de 
la Charte canadienne des droits à cet égard? La religion y fait l'objet de deux 
dispositions, soit l'article 2, et l'article 15 où est garanti le droit à l'égalité. La 
Charte se distingue des précédentes déclarations de droits en ce qu'elle insère la 
liberté de religion dans la Constitution du pays. 
I think preparing a short essay is rather like embarking upon a scientific 
experiment. When I was asked to give a paper on freedom of religion and 
minorities, I thought I knew what I was going to say, yet the further I 
ventured into the subject, the more I got diverted, or put another way, the 
more possibilities presented themselves. I am glad to be able to reflect 
upon an issue rather than always having to respond to a complaint of 
discrimination. 
Group or minority rights inherent in language and religion have always 
intrigued me but merely saying this must not obscure the fact that the 
bargain that became Canada would not have been possible without an 
acceptance, by the majority of the population, of these fundamental 
entitlements of a minority. 
Then, too, is it not ironical that some of the most egregious denials of 
freedom of religion came at the hands of a Quebec majority which had itself 
been the beneficiary of the freedom to practice and to profess its faith 
without interruption since 1760? 
I want to thank Professor Irwin Cotler, of the Faculty of Law of McGill 
University, from whose work I have borrowed extensively. 
* Président de la Commission canadienne des droits de la personne. 
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Professor Cotler provides us with an elegant and persuasive analysis of 
the subject in a chapter entitled, "Freedom of Conscience and Religion in 
Canadian Law" in Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms : Commentary,1. 
The theme of the Third International Conference on Constitutional 
Law is The Rights of Minorities and my topic, the Rights of Religious 
Minorities, enables me to range more widely than would have been possible if 
the focus had been confined to individual rights. 
It is reported in The Review, International Commission of Jurists2 that 
Mr. (Justice) Jules Deschênes has been asked to draft a definition of the term 
"minority" in relation to article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
Article 27 says : 
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practice their own religion, or to use their own language. 
The Review says : Mr. (Justice) Deschênes suggested the elimination 
from the definition of indigeneous populations, "non-citizens" and matters 
concerning the relationship between the individual and group to which he 
belongs. He proposed the following definition for discussion : 
A group numerically smaller than the rest of the population of a state, in a 
non-dominant position, whose members — being citizens of the state —possess 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the other 
members of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions or language. 
Although the definition remains under discussion, it does provide a 
useful starting point for my paper and perhaps for others of the Conference. 
By coincidence section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms also refers to minority heritage thus : 
This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation 
and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians. 
Although section 27 is interpretive and does not spell out any specific 
guarantees of what is meant by the phrase the "multicultural heritage of 
Canadians", it is an important departure in the fashioning of a constitution. 
The Charter must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation 
and enhancement ofthat heritage. 
1. W.S. TARNOPOLSKY et G.-A. BEAUDOIN, Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms: Com-
mentary. Carswell, Toronto, 1982, p. 185-211. 
2. The Review, International Commission of Jurists, No. 33, Dec. 1984, p. 38. 
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Mr . Jus t i ce W a l t e r T a r n o p o l s k y d id jus t t ha t in the case of Re Regina 
and Videoflicks Ltd.3 w h e n , speak ing for a five j u d g e O n t a r i o C o u r t of 
A p p e a l , he said : 
It is [...] the clear purpose of s. 27 that, where applicable, any right or freedom 
in the Chartershall be interpreted in light of this section. Religion is one of the 
dominant aspects of a culture which it is intended to preserve and enhance. [...] 
Section 27 determines that ours will be an open and pluralistic society which 
must accommodate the small inconveniences that might occur where different 
religious practices are recognized as permissible exceptions to otherwise 
justifiable homogeneous requirements. 
T h e C h a r t e r con ta ins t w o specific references to religion viz : 
Fundamental freedoms 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms : 
(a) freedom of conscience and religion ; 
(...) 
Peter H o g g in Canada Act 1982 Annotated4 r eminds us tha t : 
The reference to "conscience" is not found in s. 1(c) of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights or in the first amendment of the United States constitution. It is perhaps 
designed to protect systems of belief such as atheism or agnosticism, or 
possibly even quasi-religious cults, which might not be characterized as 
"religions". A possible application of "freedom of conscience and religion" is 
to resist the application of laws to practices allegedly demanded by a particular 
religion, although the practices are proscribed by law. For example, even in the 
absence of the Charter, Jehovah's Witnesses have successfully claimed 
exemption for their distribution of tracts from a municipal street by-law 
(Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] S.C.R. 299); Hare Krishnas have unsuccess-
fully sought exemption for their chanting from a municipal anti-noise by-law 
(R. v. Harroid (1971), 19 D.L.R. (3d) 471 (B.C.C.A.)); and Hutterites have 
unsuccessfully sought exemption for their practice of communal landholding 
from a landholding statute. (Walter v. A.G. Alta., [1969] S.C.R. 383). Sunday 
observance law has already been challenged as violating the "freedom of 
religion" guarantee of the Canadian Bill of Rights and the law has been upheld 
on the curious ground that its "practical result" is "purely secular and 
financial" (Robertson andRosetanni v. R., [1963] S.C.R. 651. 
Sect ion 15, the Equa l i ty Sect ion, s ta tes tha t : 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law, without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on [...] religion... 
3. Re Regina and Videoflicks Ltd., (1984) 9 C.R.R. 193, p. 224 (Ont. CA.). 
4. P.W. HOGG, Canada Act 1982 Annotated, Toronto, Carswell, 1982, p. 15. 
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The Charter also includes the cautionary provision, section 29 : 
Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or privileges 
guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect of denomi-
national, separate or dissentient schools. 
The rights are those guaranteed by section 93 of the Constitution Act, 
1867: 
In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in 
relation to Education, subject and according to the following Provisions : 
(1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privilege with 
resoect to Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons have by Law in 
the Province at the Union, 
(2) All the Powers, Privileges and Duties at the Union by Law conferred and 
imposed in Upper Canada on the Separate Schools and School Trustees of the 
Queens Roman Catholic Subjects shall be and the same are hereby extended to 
the Dissentient Schools of the Queen's Protestant and Roman Catholic Subjects 
in Quebec. 
Subsection (3) provides an appeal to Governor in Council if Legislature 
purports to pass an act affecting any right or privilege of the Protestant or 
Roman Catholic minority of the Queen's subjects... 
By subsection (4), Parliament is authorized to act if a province fails to 
respond as per subsection (3). 
Emancipation for Canadian Catholics has existed for two and one 
quarter centuries — since the Quebec Act of 1760. 
Entitlements for Jews, both to practice their faith and to hold public 
office, also came about much earlier in Canada than in the United Kingdom. 
Fundamental rights pertaining to language and religion always have 
been essential ingredients of Canadian federalism and provide an interesting 
term of reference to enable Canadians to understand and help interpret the 
preoccupation of many socialist countries of the Eastern Bloc for the 
supremacy of group rights over individual rights. As late as 1977, a 
researcher on the staff of the Pepin-Robarts Task Force on Canadian Unity, 
asked the Canadian Human Rights Commission for assistance in coming to 
terms with the concept of group rights. For me, language and religion 
seemed such obvious examples as to raise questions in my mind as to 
whether I had missed something. 
Professor Irwin Cotler, in a comprehensive review of Freedom of 
Assembly, Association, Conscience and Religion in Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms : Commentary5, makes the point : 
5. Supra, note 1, p. 124. 
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Any inquiry into constitutional process in Canada since 1867 — and even into 
much of contemporary constitutional discourse — would expose a continuing 
preoccupation with the powers of government at the expense of the rights of 
peoples. More particularly, traditional constitutional analysis and reform has 
revolved around the division of powers between the federal and provincial 
governments, as distinct from concern with limitations on the exercise of power 
regardless of government. The result is that the powers of government have 
preceded and otherwise obscured the rights of people, when it is the rights of 
people that should precede the powers of government. 
I acknowledge, sadly, that this result is inevitable in a federal state 
where the complexities inherent in the division of power tend to cloud the 
fundamental principle sought to be asserted. The good news for the 
preservation of the principle of freedom of religion is that the Charter should 
greatly reduce the need to locate a particular right jurisdictionally. The 
"double override" of parliamentary supremacy and legal federalism has 
been relegated to a secondary role in constitutional interpretation. 
Might I go so far as to predict that as a consequence of the supremacy of 
the Charter, language used by judges may assume a new eloquence of form 
and style. Although it would be hard to match the force and eloquence of 
Chief Dickson as he defined the meaning of freedom of religion in the case of 
R. v. Big M Drug Mart6, pre-Charter jurisdictional searches did not lend 
themselves to ringing declarations about rights and freedoms — finding 
one's way out of the maze of s. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act of 1867 left 
little scope for poetry. As Tom Berger put it in Fragile Freedoms7, Canada is 
an idea that goes deeper than the division of powers. 
The 1950's proved to be a high water mark for the Supreme Court of 
Canada as it sought to assert an independent constitutional existence and 
value for certain "preferred" fundamental freedoms. Freedom of religion 
provided several opportunities for this assertion and the judgments of 
Mr. Justice Ivan Rand analyzed the origins of fundamental rights as being 
essential to the bargain from which Canada sprang. 
I return to Professor Cotler who said :7 a 
An excellent case-study of legal federalism as the organizing frame of reference 
for the determination of "religion", and the confusion rendered thereby, can be 
found in the case of Saumur v. City of Québec8. 
The case dealt with a by-law of the city which forbade the distribution in the 
street of any book, pamphlet, circular, tract, etc., without prior permission of 
6. R. v. Big M Drug Marl, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. 
7. T.R. BERGER, Fragile Freedoms: Human Rights and Dissent in Canada, Toronto, Irwin 
Publishing, 1982, p. xviii. 
7a. Supra, note 1, p. 196 to 199. 
8. [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299. 
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the Chief of Police. A Witness of Jehovah challenged the validity of the by-law 
on the grounds that, inter alia, it abridged freedom of religion. In a five to four 
decision, the Supreme Court held that the by-law was invalid. 
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to determine the essential ratio of the 
decision, dramatizing the problem of the "double override". Professor (now 
Chief Justice) Laskin summed it up in 1959 as follows : 
The awkward result of the case was that while six Justices denied 
provincial competence at least in some circumstances, five Justices 
affirmed provincial competence, at least in some circumstances ; and 
while four Justices affirmed/erfera/ competence in some circumstances, 
five Justices denied federal competence at least in some circumstances ; 
and yet only three Justices denied any federal power while four Justices 
denied any provincial power.' [emphasis added] 
Another way of summarizing the result of the case is that four judges held that 
the by-law was ultra-vires as being in relation to freedom of religion and 
therefore beyond provincial jurisdiction, four judges held that it was intra vires, 
but only two held that freedom of religion was within provincial jurisdiction. 
The other two held that the by-law was not in relation to freedom of religion, 
but that it was intra vires since it was in relation to the use of streets, parks, and 
sidewalks (s. 92.13). The swing vote was cast by Chief Justice Kerwin, who held 
that the by-law was intra-vires but in breach of the Freedom of Worship Act of 
1851 and therefore invalid. Accordingly, Jehovah's Witnesses, and for that 
matter any religious group, would not have to seek the permission of the Chief 
of Police for the distribution of their literature. 
The confusion seemed to abate somewhat in the Birksl0 case, where the 
Supreme Court of Canada, in a unanimous decision, came somewhat closer to 
resolving the jurisdictional issue respecting "religion" by deciding that the 
matter of "holy" day observance is within the criminal law power and not 
within provincial jurisdiction. In a way, this was merely an extension of the 
decision in 1903 of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that "Sunday 
Observance" legislation was in relation to criminal law. " In any case, although 
only three of the nine judges went so far as to state that the provinces could not 
legislate with respect to freedom of religion, the other six making no statement 
on this point, many Canadian constitutional experts have argued that this is 
the clear effect of the case.12 
The only decision of the Supreme Court of Canada respecting "religion" under 
the Canadian Bill of Rights lends further support to the view that "freedom of 
religion" is essentially within the jurisdiction of Parliament. In 1963, in the case 
of Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen" the Supreme Court dealt with the 
effect of the Canadian Bill of Rights, and the declaration therein on freedom of 
religion, on the Lord's Day Act. Although the majority held that the Bill of 
Rights did not repeal the Lord's Day Act, they also declared that the position 
9. B. LASKIN, "An Inquiry Into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights, (1959) 37 Can. Bar Rev. 77, 
p. 116-117. 
10. Henry Birks & Sons (Montreal) Ltd. v. Montreal, [1955] S.C.R. 799. 
11. Attorney General Ontario v. Hamilton Street Ry., [1903] A.C. 524. 
12. See, for example, the symposium in (1959) 37 Can. Bar Rev. 
13. [1963] S.C.R. 651. 
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of religious freedom in the Canadian system was that outlined by Mr. Justice 
Rand in the Saumur l4 case, who was one of the four who held it to be beyond 
the jurisdiction of the provinces, at least in the sense of laws "in relation 
thereto". Admittedly, the judgment in this case itself is somewhat confusing. In 
the Robertson 16 case the court looked at the effect of the Lord Day's Act, 
considered it to be secular, and held that it did not conflict with freedom of 
religion, and by implication, was not federal. 
Finally, there are some important dicta " in the Saumur case by Rand and 
Locke JJ. that may be relevant, if not persuasive, not only regarding the 
interpretation and application of freedom of conscience and religion under the 
Charter, but for s. 2 as a whole. Indeed, when these dicta in the Saumur case 
alone, are joined together with those in Alberta Press,11 Winner,'9 Switzman,20 
Roncarelli,2' Henry Birks22 and, to a lesser extent, Oil Chemical23 and McKay v. 
The Queen24 there is a formidable jurisprudence that may be invoked as 
authoritative precedent under the Charter. Witness the following : 
On Freedom of Religion : 
From 1760... to the present... religious freedom has... been recognized as 
a principle of fundamental character; and although we have nothing in 
the nature of an established church, that the untrammelled affirmations 
of religious belief and its propagation, personal or institutional, remain 
as of the greatest constitutional significance throughout the Dominion 
is unquestionable.25 
On Freedom of Speech & Religion : 
[Fjreedom of speech, religion and the inviolability of the person, are 
original freedoms which are at once the necessary attributes and modes 
of self-expression of human beings and the primary conditions of their 
community life within a legal order.26 
Also, although not generally considered an exposition of the implied bill of 
rights theory, Mr. Justice Casey's opinion in Chabot v. School Commissioners 
of Lamorandière " is deserving of mention here. The Quebec Court of Appeal 
held that the Education Act did not apply as to deny the right to control the 
14. Supra, note 8. 
15. Supra, note 10. 
16. Supra, note 13. 
17. Supra, note 8. 
18. Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100. 
19. A.G. Ont. v. Winner, [1954] A.C. 541 (P.C.). 
20. Switzman v. Ebling, [1957] S.C.R. 285. 
21. Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121. 
22. Supra, note 10. 
23. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Wkrs. International Union v. Imperial Oil Ltd., (1961), 30 D.L.R. 
(2"d)657(B.C.S.C). 
24. [1965] S.C.R. 798. 
25. Supra, note 8, p. 327. 
26. Id, p. 329. 
27. (1957), 12 D.L.R. (2d) 796 (Québec Q.B.). 
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religious education of his children. Thus a Jehovah's Witness parent was 
permitted to compel the school authorities in Quebec to accept his children and 
to insist that they be exempted from Roman Catholic religious instruction. 
After citing the dictum of Rand J. in the Saumurn case, Casey J. said : 
What concerns us now is the denial of appellant's rights of inviolability 
of conscience, a denial that is coupled with or effected by... active 
interference with his right to control the religious education of his 
children... the rights of which we have been speaking, find their source 
in natural law... if these rights find their source in positive law they can 
be taken away. But if, as they do, they find their existence in the very 
nature of man, then they cannot be taken away and they must prevail 
should they conflict with the provisions of positive law.29 
Freedom of conscience and religion under the Charter may not be "inalienable" 
in the sense in which Casey J. has spoken of them, but they are certainly more 
fundamental under the Charter than the ordinary positive law, which Casey J. 
felt "can be taken away". Admittedly, the new override of s. 33 coupled with 
the s. 1 limitations clause may yet create a new "double override"; and the 
"double override" of the past, while now contained, has not been removed. But 
a new order of fundamental freedoms has been entrenched. And it is to be 
hoped that the preferred freedoms will not be taken away, while freedom of 
conscience together with religion now has the distinguishable status of which 
Casey spoke. 
At the second reading of the British North America Bill in the Imperial 
Parliament, on 19 February 1867, Lord Carnarvon who was sponsoring the 
measure, spoke as follows in reference to section 93 : 
This clause has been framed after long and anxious controversy, in which all 
parties have been represented, and on conditions to which all have given their 
consent... and I am bound to add as an expression of my own opinion that the 
terms of the arrangement (for separate schools) appear to me to be both 
equitable and judicious. 
Despite the fact that section 93 is really only a restatement of a statutory 
entitlement agreed to a century earlier, its inclusion in the Constitution Act of 
1867 did not end the debate. A bargain was renewed by Her Majesty's 
Protestant and Catholic subjects (to employ the term of the day) yet the 
equity and judiciousness of the bargain did not extend to protect the 
minorities who happened to be Witnesses of Jehovah. 
The War Measures Act was utilized in both World Wars to jail 
Jehovah's Witnesses and censor and ban their publications. The Criminal 
Code, municipal by-laws, and liquor licensing statutes are but some of the 
28. Supra, note 8. 
29. Supra, note 27, p. 807. 
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majoritarian compulsions utilized in an attempt to foreclose freedom to 
believe and to profess one's religion by a minority group. 
Mr. Justice Walter Tarnopolsky has said : 
The best testing of the standard of civil liberties in a society is the way that 
society treats its dissenters and minorities. Few dissenters, and no other 
religious minorities, have put Canada to the test quite so acutely in this century 
as have the Witnesses of Jehovah.30 
To return to the Big M Drug Mart Ltd. case31, consider these paragraphs 
from the judgment of the Chief Justice : 
A truly free society is one which can accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, 
diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conduct. A free society is 
one which aims at equality with respect to the enjoyment of fundamental 
freedoms [...] Freedom must surely be founded in respect for the inherent 
dignity and the inviolable rights of the human person. The essence of the 
concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a 
person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of 
hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and 
practice or by teaching and dissemination. But the concept means more than 
that. 
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or 
constraint. If a person is compelled by the state or the will of another to a 
course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have chosen, he is 
not acting of his own volition and he cannot be said to be truly free. One of the 
major purposes of the Charter is to protect, within reason, from compulsion or 
restraint... 
By its decision the Supreme Court of Canada did not seek to emphasize 
individual rights at the expense of collective or minority rights. Canada has 
always been committed to the protection of both and despite what I believe 
to have been an overly differential approach to jurisdiction, an element of 
the bargain was recognition of the entitlement of a minority of Canadians to 
practice their religion. Federalism requires a balancing of individual and 
community interests. Homogeneity may have application to the cultures 
from whence Canadians sprang but it never found root in this new land. 
Judge Rosalie Abella has provided me with an elegant aphorism with 
which to conclude this essay. "There is no absolute morality in majority 
interests, any more than there is in minority ones". Freedom of religion for 
individuals and for groups is now secure as part of the fundamental law of 
Canada. 
30. M.J. PENTON, Jehovah's Witnesses in Canada: Champions of Freedom of Speech and 
Worship, (1978) 59 Can. Historical Review 259 (Book Review). 
31. Supra, note 6, p. 336. 
